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1. Introduction 
 
Many persons with significant disabilities are unable to obtain health insurance in 
the private sector that provides coverage of the services that enable them to live 
independently and enter, remain in, or rejoin the workforce. For individuals with 
disabilities currently receiving health care under Medicaid, the fear of losing their health 
care and related services is one of the greatest barriers keeping such individuals from 
maximizing their employment, earnings potential, and independence. For many 
individual SSDI and SSI recipients, the risk of losing Medicare and Medicaid coverage 
that is linked to their cash benefits is a risk that is an equal or greater work disincentive 
than the loss of cash benefits associated with working. 
 
To allow workers with income levels higher than SSI requirements to maintain 
their Medicaid coverage, the federal government has provided states with an optional 
“Medicaid Buy-In program.” The Buy-In allows qualifying people with disabilities 
whose income levels are too high for them to receive SSI, to purchase Medicaid coverage 
much like one would purchase any health insurance policy. The Medicaid Buy-In was 
first made a state option through the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (Section 4733). The 1999 
passage of TWWIIA expanded the number and type of choices states can make if they 
decide to implement a Medicaid Buy-In program. 
 
States primarily support working persons with disabilities through implementation 
of Buy-In programs. Twenty-nine states (Bicameral Briefing on Medicaid Buy-in 
Programs for Working Individuals with Disabilities, 2001) have adopted some form of a 
Medicaid Buy-In program that enables persons with disabilities to continue eligibility for 
Medicaid-financed services. 
 
States with Buy-In programs implemented them following guidelines outlined in 
either the Balanced Budget Act (1997) or in TWWIIA (1999). Older programs tend to 
follow BBA guidelines and newer programs tend to follow TWWIIA guidelines. 
Nebraska’s Buy-In program currently follows the BBA guidelines.  
 
This report provides projections of the number of qualified unmarried 
Nebraskans expected to enroll in the current Medicaid Buy-In program. (The current 
policy is summarized in the table presented below.) To gauge the effect of changes in 
specific policy parameters, we also estimate enrollment in the program under different 
policy scenarios. These projections are based on a number of underlying assumptions. 
We assume that all qualified Nebraskans have complete knowledge of the program, 
there is no perceived social stigma attached to participation in the program, and that 
enrollment for qualified individuals is costless.  
 
The report is organized around the presentation of six tables of population 
projections. After I describe the data and the general methodology, I present the detailed 
model and assumptions used to calculate the estimates presented in the tables. 
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Summary of Nebraska’s Medicaid Buy-In Eligibility Criteria 
 
Income Eligibility Test A:  
Unearned Income < FBR  
Test B:  
Countable Income < 250% 
                                FPG  
 
Countable Income Disregards: 
SSI (first $65 earned, $20 earned/unearned, 50% 
of remaining), SSDI if in TWP, VA disability 
payment, Worker’s Compensation, Civil Service 
disability, Private disability insurance 
Asset limits $4000 ind/$6000 couple  
Premium/Cost 
Sharing 
Net family income  
200% FPG or less=$0 
200-210%FPG=2% of 
excess 
210-220%=4% 
Sliding scale 
240-250% FPG=10% 
Individual Premium 
$716-1431=$0 
$1432-1502=$29 
$1503-1574=$61 
$1575-1645=$96 
$1646-1717=$134 
$1718-1789=$175 
Couple Premium 
$968-1935=$0 
$1936-2031=$39 
$2032-2128=$83 
$2129-2224=$130 
$2225-2321=$181 
$2322-2419=$237 
 
 
Data Sources 
 
The projections are based on the distribution of characteristics of individuals from 18 to 
64 years of age with self-reported work disabilities from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) conducted jointly by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. These data are contained in the Annual Demographic Files for March 2000 
and 2001.  
 
There are a total of 2,064 persons aged 18 to 64 in the Nebraska samples where each 
person represents an average of 498 persons. (According to the 2000 Census there were 
1,028,826 Nebraskans between 18 and 64 years old, giving a sampling weight of .002 
for the CPS sample of all Nebraskans 18 to 64.) The number of individuals in these 
samples who have self-reported work disabilities is 180 or 8.72%. 
 
We also use the national sample of 2,141 individuals with self-reported working 
disabilities from the CPS March 2001 Supplement to estimate labor force participation 
and earnings equations based on individual demographic characteristics and State 
Medicaid eligibility criteria. These equations form the basis of predictions of who will 
work in Nebraska and how much they will earn based on individual characteristics and 
Nebraska Medicaid eligibility criteria. 
 
Additionally, national and state information published by the US Bureau of the Census 
and the Social Security Administration (SSA) is used to project the number of 
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities whose disabilities would qualify them 
for SSDI or SSI. This category of individuals is classified as having severe work 
disabilities. 
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Projection Methodology 
 
I use a sequential approach to project the number of enrollees in Nebraska’s  
Medicaid Buy-In Program similar to Howe’s (“Projecting Enrollment in a Medicaid buy-
In Program for Ohio,” by Steven R. Howe, 2001) methodology for projecting Ohio’s 
enrollment. Howe classifies the population by SSDI/SSI participant group and then by 
Medicaid and employment history status to estimate the number of state residents who 
will both qualify and enroll in the program. By doing this, he takes into account the fact 
that program participation differs by subgroups and can make more efficient use of 
national and state statistics.  
 
Although I use Howe’s general sequential approach, I supplement it with 
predictions from econometric models estimated from the national CPS sample. The 
econometric models assume that individuals’ choices, such as working or not working, 
are continuous functions of demographic and state policy variables. Estimation of these 
models using national data provides both conditional predictions of labor force 
participation and labor supply under a specific program and provides estimates of the 
effect of policy changes on individuals’ work choice.  
  
In Sections 2 and 3, I supplement the Nebraska and national CPS samples with 
relevant aggregate statistics published by the Census and SSA to estimate the number of 
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities and then to estimate those Nebraskans 
whose disability qualifies them for federal SSDI or SSI disability benefits. In Section 4, I 
present estimates of the number of Nebraskans who are unmarried and whose disability 
and whose income and asset levels qualify them for the Medicaid Buy-In program under 
Nebraska’s current policy parameters. The final section presents projections of the 
number of qualified unmarried Nebraskans who will choose to work and enroll in the 
current program. Appendix B examines the effect on Nebraska’s Buy-In enrollment 
projections from changing a number of policy parameters. Projections are presented 
under seven alternative policy scenarios. 
 
2. Population of Nebraskans with Self-Reported Work Disabilities 
 
 In this section, I present the relevant characteristics of the Nebraska 2000 and 
2001 CPS samples and use them to estimate the relevant population figures. When 
possible, I compare these estimates to those based on Census or SSA sources to gauge 
the reliability of the CPS sample estimates. I then use these estimates to project the 
number of Nebraskans with reported work disabilities by SSDI or SSI status, and by 
Medicaid and work experience status. These figures are presented in Table 1. 
 
Work Disability: According to the CPS Nebraska samples, 89,714 Nebraskans between 
18 and 64 years old, or 8.72%, report a work disability. A person is considered to have a 
work disability if any of the following conditions were reported (a person might have 
reported multiple conditions): 
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 A health problem or disability limits the kind or amount of work (89% of the 89,714 
people) 
 A disability is the main reason for not working (31%) 
 An individual is not in the labor force because of a disability (22%) 
 
Published data from the U.S. Census Bureau shows that 9.38% of Americans aged 16 
to 64 have a work disability. 
 
Employment: Of the 89,714 people with a work disability, 63.33% showed some 
evidence of working or having worked recently, or at least of having wanted to work 
recently. 
 
  59.44% had worked at least once during the previous calendar year. 
  48.89% had a job at the time of the interview and an additional 3.33% were looking 
 for work. The remaining people (47.78%) were not in the labor force. 
  About 2.22% said at the time of the interview that they had tried to find a job last  
year 
 
Note that the population of all persons with work disabilities includes persons with both 
serious and less serious work disabilities. The employment rates presented above are 
much higher than would be found among the subset of people whose disabilities are 
severe, such as persons who might qualify for SSDI or SSI. 
 
 
Health Insurance: Of the 89,714  people with a work disability, only 17% reported that 
they had no health insurance during the previous calendar year. People might have 
reported having multiple forms of insurance, either because of simultaneous coverage or 
because of serial changes in coverage. Thus, the following percentages add to more than 
the percentage of people with coverage of any kind (83%). 
 
 21% reported Medicaid coverage. 
 14% reported Medicare coverage. 
 32% reported coverage through their current or former job or union. 
 34% reported some other form of health insurance, such as CHAMPUS (federal 
employees), VA (veterans) or private insurance other than through their job or union. 
 
 
SSDI and SSI Income: According to the Social Security Administration, 25,320 
Nebraskans of all ages received SSDI in 2000. Although this amount is reported for all 
ages, it should only be relevant for those under 65 years old since SSDI payments are 
reported as SS retirement payments after the recipient reaches retirement age. If one 
also assumes that relatively few Nebraskans under the age of 18 receive SSDI 
payments, then the 25,320 figure represents 28.21% of the 89,714 Nebraskans from 18 
to 64 with work disabilities. 
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Based on the CPS Nebraska subsamples, there were 24,923 or 27.78% of 
Nebraskans from 18 to 64 with work disabilities who received SSDI. This figure 
assumes that no one in the sample received any retirement payments from Social 
Security.  
 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) reports that 14,368 Nebraskans 
between the ages of 18 and 64 received SSI benefits in the year 2000. (This figure 
includes 779 individuals who were 1619b recipients and thus received Medicaid 
benefits but no cash payments.) Dividing this figure by 89,714, we find that, according 
to SSA, 16.02% of Nebraskans with work disabilities received SSI in 2000. According 
to the Nebraska CPS sample, however, only 11,466 or 12.78% of Nebraskans in this 
group were SSI recipients in the year 2000. (Part of this discrepancy could be due to 
that some of the 1619b recipients in the CPS sample were not counted as receiving SSI 
benefits because they did not report SSI payments.) 
 
The number of Nebraskans (aged 18 through 64) who received both SSDI and 
SSI benefits in the year 2000 was 5,352 as reported by SSA (Table 43 in the 2000 
Annual Statistical Report on SSDI Program). This corresponds to 5.97% of the 89,714 
Nebraskans with work disabilities. In the CPS sample, 4.44%, or 3,983 Nebraskans with 
work disabilities reported receiving both SSDI and SSI payments. 
 
To estimate the proportion of Nebraskans aged 18 through 64 reporting work 
disabilities who receive either SSDI or SSI benefits, one adds the proportions receiving 
either benefit and subtracts the proportion receiving both. If we base this estimate on 
our Nebraska CPS sample, we find that 36.12 % of our population received either SSDI 
or SSI benefits in the year 2000. If we base this estimate on the SSA reports, we 
estimate that 38.24% received at least one of the federal disability benefits. Thus, the 
two sources’ estimates are relatively close suggesting that our CPS sample produces 
reliable estimates. We base our projections on the SSA estimate and assume that 38.24 
% of 89,714, or 34,307, Nebraskans from 18 to 64 years old with work disabilities 
receive either SSDI or SSI benefits.  
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Table 1: Projected Numbers of Persons with Work Disabilities 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Evidence 
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
Persons Who 
Receive SSDI 
or SSI 
Receives 
Medicaid 
6,861 10,028 16,889 
Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
5,805 11,613 17,418  
Total 12,666 21,641 34,307 
 
 Evidence  
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
Persons Who 
Do Not 
Receive SSDI 
or SSI 
Receives 
Medicaid 
1,446 964 2,410 
 Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
41,915 11,082 52,997 
 Total 43,361 12,046 55,407 
 
 Evidence  
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
All Persons Receives 
Medicaid 
8,307 10,992 19,299 
Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
47,720 22,695 70,415  
Total 56,027 33,687 89,714 
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Table 1 presents the estimated number of Nebraskans aged 18 to 64 with self-
reported work disabilities by SSDI or SSI status and by evidence of work and Medicaid 
status. According to these projections, about half of those receiving SSDI or SSI 
benefits receive Medicaid and about 37% have some evidence of work. Of those not 
receiving SSDI or SSI benefits, a little over 4% receive Medicaid and about 78% have 
some work evidence. 
 
 
3. Population of Nebraskans with Qualifying (Severe) Work Disabilities 
 
Not every person represented in Table 1 has a disability that would meet the 
Medicaid severe work disability standard. In this section, I use published information on 
the U.S. disabled population and severely working disabled population by age and labor 
force status to estimate the number of Nebraskans represented in Table 1 whose 
disability would qualify them for SSI or SSDI disability benefits. The projections of the 
numbers of Nebraskans who have a severe work disability by SSDI/SSI status and by 
work evidence and Medicaid status are presented in Table 2. 
  
According to the Census Bureau, 66.2% of 16 to 64 year olds who have a work 
disability meet the severe work disability standard. (See Table 2, Labor Force Status-
Work Disability Status of Civilians 16 to 74 year old). Using this figure, we estimate 
that 59,391 Nebraskans (66.2% of the 89,714 Nebraskans with self-reported work 
disabilities) have a severe work disability.  
 
Following Howe (2001), I assume that all of the 34,307 individuals represented 
in Table 1 who receive SSDI or SSI benefits have a severe work disability. Thus, 
34,307 of Nebraskans with a severe work disability receive SSDI or SSI benefits and 
25,084 do not. To find the distribution over work evidence status and Medicaid status of 
the non-SSDI and non-SSI recipients with severe work disabilities, we use the fact that 
those with severe work disabilities are less likely to be employed than those with less-
severe work disabilities. 
 
The Census Bureau reports a national employment rate of 8.3% for 16 to 64 year 
olds with a severe work disability. Because the employment rate of SSI disabled 
recipients in Nebraska is the fifth highest in the nation (16.3%, or 243% of the national 
employment rate of SSI disabled recipients) I adjust the national employment rates to 
account for this fact. I estimate the employment rate of Nebraskans with severe 
disabilities to be 20.2% (2.43 times the national rate of 8.3%). From these estimates, we 
find that 11,997 of Nebraskans with severe work disabilities are employed (20.2% of 
the 59,391 Nebraskans with severe work disabilities.)  
 
The final step in estimating the number of Nebraskans with Medicaid-qualifying 
disabilities by each category in Table 1 is to combine the CPS labor force information 
with the estimated Nebraska employment rates. Given the assumption that those who 
receive SSDI or SSI have a Medicaid-qualified work disability, according to the CPS 
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sample, 6,861 Nebraskans with a severe disability are currently employed and receive 
SSDI or SSI. Of the Nebraska SSDI or SSI disabled recipients, 27,446 are not 
employed. Since there are a total of 11,997 employed Nebraskans with a severe 
disability, 5,136 of these persons do not receive SSDI or SSI. Therefore, 19,948 of the 
25,084 Nebraskans who have a qualifying work disability and who are receiving neither 
SSDI nor SSI are not employed. 
 
From the CPS sample, we estimate that 31,798 (57.39% of 34,307) Nebraskans 
with self-reported work disabilities who are not receiving SSDI or SSI are currently 
working and 23,609 Nebraskans in this group are not currently working. Based on our 
previous estimate, we know that of the 23,609 non-working Nebraskans in this group, 
19,948 have a qualifying work disability. From this we estimate that 84.5% of 
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities who are neither employed nor receiving 
SSDI or SSI payments have a severe work disability.  
 
Table 2 presents estimates of the number of Nebraskans with Medicaid 
qualifying work disabilities categorized by SSDI/SSI status, work evidence and 
Medicaid status. To estimate the proportion of Nebraskans not receiving SSDI or SSI 
who have severe work disabilities by Medicaid status, we follow Howe (2001) and 
assume that the proportion of non-employed non-SSDI/SSI recipients who qualify as 
severely work disabled is the same as the proportion of those with no work evidence 
who qualify as severely work disabled. Given this assumption, we estimate that there 
are 10,179 Nebraskans with a Medicaid-qualifying work disability who receive neither 
SSDI nor SSI and have no work evidence. Of these, 815 are currently receiving 
Medicaid and 9,364 are not. not receiving or 84.5% of the 12,046 Nebraskans not 
receiving SSDI or SSI with no work evidence. 
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Table 2: Projected Numbers of Persons with Severe Work Disabilities 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Evidence 
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
Persons Who 
Receive SSDI 
or SSI 
Receives 
Medicaid 
6,861 10,028 16,889 
Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
5,805 11,613 17,418  
Total 12,666 21,641 34,307 
 
 Evidence  
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
Persons Who 
Do Not 
Receive SSDI 
or SSI 
Receives 
Medicaid 
499 815 1,314 
 Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
14,406 9,364 23,770 
 Total 14,905 10,179 25,084 
 
 Evidence  
Of Work 
No Evidence  
Of Work 
Total 
All Persons Receives 
Medicaid 
7,360 10,843 18,203 
Does Not 
Receive 
Medicaid 
20,211 20,977 41,188  
Total 27,571 31,820 59,391 
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4. Population of Unmarried Nebraskans with Medicaid-Qualified Work 
Disabilities 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of the number of unmarried Nebraskans who qualify 
for the Medicaid Buy-In program for the working disabled by SSDI/SSI and Medicaid 
status. These individuals represent the relevant population for our enrollment 
projections under different policy scenarios. The figures in Table 3 are based on the 
assumption that the proportion of unmarried Medicaid-qualified Nebraskans is the same 
as the proportion of unmarried Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities given 
their SSDI/SSI status.  
 
 In the CPS sample, 68.75% of Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities 
who receive SSDI or SSI are unmarried and 50% of those not receiving SSDI or SSI are 
unmarried. From these estimates, we project that 36,112 Nebraskans from 18 to 64 have 
Medicaid-qualified work disabilities. Of these, 16,944 are currently receiving Medicaid 
and 19,168 are not. 
 
Table 3: Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
16,080  864 16,944 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 7,504 11,664 19,168 
Total 
 
23,584 28,608 36,112 
 
 
Income and Asset Qualifications: Not all Nebraskans with severe work disabilities 
meet the income and asset limitations of the Medicaid Buy-In program. For a working 
individual with a Medicaid-qualifying disability to qualify for Medicaid Insurance for 
Workers with Disabilities in Nebraska, two income tests must be passed. Test A 
compares the individual’s unearned income to the Federal Benefit Rate (FBR). If 
unearned income is less than the FBR, Test A is passed. Test B compares the 
individual’s countable income to 250% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline 
(FPG). If countable income is less than the FPG, Test B is passed. 
 
We report in Table 4 the projected number of unmarried Nebraskans with 
Medicaid-qualifying work disabilities that would qualify for the current Buy-In program 
if they worked. We follow Howe (2001) and base earned income qualification on 
actual earned income of those in the CPS sample who are currently working and on 
projected income of those currently not working. Our projected earned income is the 
predicted value from a regression estimated using the 2,141 individuals with reported 
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work disabilities from the national CPS sample. The earned income prediction equation 
is a function of the individual’s age, sex, education level and race as well as two 
variables that depend on specific state Medicaid policy parameters. (Details of the 
regression model are presented in Appendix A.)  
 
 Unearned income qualification is based on the reported unearned income of those 
in the CPS sample. Because the CPS survey does not include information on individuals’ 
assets, we estimate assets by multiplying annual earnings from dividends, interest, and 
rent by 20 (assuming an annual average return of 5%). Individuals qualify if their non-
exempted assets are less than $4,000, the current Nebraska asset limit for unmarried 
individuals. 
 
 According to the CPS sample, if every unmarried Nebraskans with self-reported 
work disabilities were working, 45.5% of those receiving SSDI or SSI payments qualify 
for the Buy-In and 72.3% not receiving SSDI or SSI payments qualify. The projections in 
Table 4 assume that these proportions also apply to those with Medicaid qualifying work 
disabilities. Based on this assumption, we estimate that 10,720 Nebraskans who receive 
SSDI or SSI would qualify for the Buy-In if they worked and 9,072 who do not receive 
SSDI or SSI would qualify if they worked.  
 
 
Table 4: Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities 
Who Qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In Program If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
9,112 648 9,760 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 1,608 8,424 10,032 
Total 
 
10,720 9,072 19,792 
 
 
Number of Persons Projected to Hold Jobs: To qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In 
program the individual must be employed as well as have a Medicaid-qualifying 
disability and meet the State Program’s income and asset requirements. Although the 
individuals represented in Table 4 would qualify for the current program if they worked, 
not all of these individuals will work. To estimate the number of persons who will work 
under the current Buy-In program we first calculate the probability of employment for 
each individual in the CPS sample and average over individuals by SSDI/SSI, Medicaid, 
educational and work evidence status to find the proportion of persons in each category 
who will work. We then multiply the resulting employment rates by the numbers of 
income and asset-qualified Nebraskans in each category.  
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The probability of being employed is modeled as an individual binary choice 
variable that depends on the individual’s educational level, race, State of residence, asset 
level and a State-specific Medicaid policy parameter. The model is estimated using the 
national CPS sample of individuals with self-reported work disabilities. (Details of the 
estimation are presented in Appendix A.) 
  
Table 5 presents our projections of the number of unmarried Nebraskans between 
18 and 64 years old who qualify for Medicaid Insurance for Workers with Disabilities 
under the current State policy. Our model predicts that about 20% of unmarried 
Nebraskans with Medicaid-qualifying work disabilities who currently receive Medicaid 
qualify for the current Medicaid Buy-In Program and about 27% not currently receiving 
Medicaid payments qualify for the current program. We project a total of 8,645 
unmarried Nebraskans qualify for the program under Nebraska’s current policy 
parameters. 
  
 
Table 5: Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons 
with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Current Buy-In Policy 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
1,591 123 1,714 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  298 1,776 2,074 
Total 
 
1,889 1,889 3,788 
 
 
Number of Persons Projected to Enroll in Current Program:  The final step in 
projecting the number of unmarried Nebraskans who will participate in Buy-In Program 
is to estimate the probability that a qualified individual will choose to enroll. We follow 
Howe (2001) and assume that the probability of enrollment falls as the Medicaid Buy-In 
premium increases and that the probability of enrollment is smaller for those with 
existing health coverage.  
 
We also assume that qualified individuals who are receiving Medicaid currently 
and who are either eligible for SSI payments or are eligible for Medicaid under SSI 
1619b have little incentive to enroll. We assume that only 1% of this latter group will 
enroll in the Buy-In. Of those who are covered by Medicaid currently but do not fall 
into this group, we assume the probability of enrollment is 5% for those with other 
health insurance and 10% for those with no other current coverage. The probability of 
enrollment for those not covered currently by Medicaid is assumed to be 25% for those 
with other health insurance coverage and 70% for those with no other coverage. 
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Following Howe (2001), we assume that these probabilities are relevant when the 
Medicaid premium rate is zero. For each 1 percentage point increase in the Medicaid 
premium rate, the enrollment probabilities fall by 10%. 
 
Table 6 presents our projections of the number of unmarried Nebraskans who 
will enroll in the current Medicaid Buy-In program.  These estimates were calculated by 
averaging the probability of enrollment for each qualified individual in the CPS sample 
over SSDI/SSI, Medicaid, educational and work evidence status to find the proportion 
of persons in each category who will enroll. We then multiply the resulting enrollment 
rates by the numbers of Nebraskans in each category who both qualify for the program 
and choose to work. 
 
Table 6: Projection of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will 
Work and Enroll in the Current Medicaid Buy-In Program 
 (Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
16 
 
6 
 
22 
 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
 
 177 
 
850 
 
 
 
1,027 
 
Total 
 
   
193 
 
856 
  
1,049 
 
 
5. Effect of Policy Parameters on Projections 
 
 The results in Table 6 show that, under our model’s assumptions, approximately 
1,049 unmarried Nebraskans from 18 to 64 will enroll in Nebraska’s Medicaid Buy-In 
Program. Of these, we estimate that 193 initially received SSDI or SSI benefits and 856 
did not. Our model predicts that only a small portion (about 2%) of the total enrollees 
was initially receiving Medicaid benefits even though almost half (about 49%) of those 
whose income and assets qualify them for the program are currently receiving Medicaid 
coverage. The reason for this difference is the assumption that few (only 1%) of those 
currently receiving Medicaid benefits will choose to enroll in the Buy-In if their income 
and assets still qualify them for SSI payments or 1619b status. 
 
To gauge the effect of changes in policy parameters (such as asset and income 
limits) on Medicaid Buy-In enrollment, we recalculate the numbers of Nebraskans who 
would qualify assuming they were employed, who qualify and choose to work, and who 
enroll in the program under seven different policy scenarios. The policy scenarios are 
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defined below and Appendix B reports the detailed projections. Table 7 summarizes the 
effects of the different policies on the projected numbers of Nebraskans who qualify, 
who both qualify and choose to work, and who choose to enroll. We report the 
percentage change in the projected numbers for each scenario relative to the current 
policy. We report not only the percentage difference in the projection totals but also 
report the percentage difference by initial SSDI/SSI status.  
 
 
Alternative Policy Scenario Parameters 
 Relative to Current Nebraska Medicaid Buy-In Policy 
 
Policy 
Scenario 
Income Eligibility 
Requirements 
Asset Limits Premium 
Schedule 
 
1 
 
 
Same 
 
$10,000 
 
Same 
 
2 
 
 
Same 
 
$20,000 
 
Same 
 
3 
 
 
Same 
 
Same 
 
None 
 
4 
 
No Test A 
 
Same 
Premiums begin 
at Lower Income 
(150% FPG) 
 
5 
Higher Countable 
Income Limit 
(450% FPG) 
 
Same 
Sliding Scale 
Premiums from 
250% to 450% 
FPG 
 
6 
 
Same 
 
$12,000 
Premiums begin 
at Lower Income 
(150% FPG) 
 
7 
Higher Countable 
Income Limit 
(450% FPG) & 
No Test A 
 
$20,000 
Flat %10 Rate of 
Income above 
200% FPG 
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Table 7 
Percentage Increase in Projections under Policy i (i = 1, 2,…,7) 
Relative to Current Nebraska Policy 
 
Number Qualified 
Given Employed 
Number Qualified and 
Working 
Number Who Enroll  
Policy  
SSDI
/SSI 
No 
SSDI
/SSI 
Total SSDI/
SSI 
No 
SSDI
/SSI 
Total SSDI
/SSI 
No 
SSDI
/SSI 
Total 
 
1 
 
   
   0.0 
  
   2.4 
   
   1.1 
    
    0.0 
   
   4.0 
   
  1.7 
    
  0.0 
   
  0.8 
     
  0.67 
 
2 
 
    
   0.0 
  
   2.4 
   
   1.1 
     
    0.0 
  
   4.0    
   
  1.7 
     
  0.0 
    
  0.8 
     
  0.67 
 
3 
 
   
    0.0 
  
   0.0 
  
   0.0 
     
    0.0 
   
   0.0 
   
  0.0 
    
   0.0 
    
  9.5 
   
  7.7 
 
4 
 
  
  95.0 
  
   7.0 
 
 54.7 
   
  84.0 
   
   5.6 
  
44.3 
   
 82.0 
    
  3.0 
 
17.5 
 
5 
 
   
    0.0 
  
   4.8 
   
  2.2 
   
  15.0 
 
 12.8 
  
13.6 
    
   9.8    
   
24.5 
 
21.8 
 
6 
 
  
    0.0 
  
   2.4 
   
  1.1 
     
    0.0 
   
  4.0 
    
  1.7 
    
   0.0 
  
 -2.3 
  
 -1.9 
 
7 
 
 
105.0 
 
 23.8 
 
67.8 
 
138.6 
   
  8.3 
  
73.0 
 
193.0 
  
- 42.5 
     
 0.76 
 
 
According to the estimated differences in Table 7, a change from Nebraska’s 
current policy to either Policy 4 or 7 will have the largest effect on the number of 
unmarried Nebraskans who will qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In program. These Policy 
Scenarios eliminate Test A, the unearned income test. Under both policies, the 
elimination of Test A benefits those currently receiving SSDI or SSI by a much greater 
proportion than it benefits those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI.  
 
Although both Policies 4 and 7 lead to approximately the same increase in the 
number of SSDI/SSI recipients whose income and assets will qualify them, Policy 7 
results in a larger increase in the proportion that will choose to work. Policy 7 has both 
a higher break-even income level than Policy 4 and allows participants to hold more 
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assets. Policy 7, however, has a much higher premium rate than does Policy 4. When 
comparing the two policies’ enrollment projections, we see that, under Policy 7, total 
enrollment remains about the same as under the current Buy-In program whereas Policy 
4 leads to an increase in total enrollment of about 17.5%. Evidently, the high premium 
rate under Policy 7 discourages those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI from 
enrolling. There is a predicted 42.5% decrease in this group’s enrollment over the 
current Policy’s projection. Both Policies 4 and 7 lead to a large increase in enrollment 
projections of those currently receiving SSDI or SSI. Under Policy 7, the model predicts 
a 193% increase in enrollment and, under Policy 4, the model predicts an 82% increase 
in this group’s enrollment. 
 
The Policy Scenario that is predicted to lead to the largest increase in enrollment 
compared to the current policy is Policy 5. This policy increases the current 250% FPG 
countable income limit to 450%. Although this leads to only a small increase in the 
projected number of income-qualified individuals, it increases the projected number of 
those who choose to work by about 13.6% and those who choose to enroll by 21.8%.  
 
Policy Scenario 4 leads to the second largest increase in projected enrollment 
with an increase of 17.5% predicted over the current policy’s projected enrollment. 
Unlike Policy 5, most of the increase in projected enrollment under Policy 4 is due to an 
increase in enrollment of those currently receiving SSDI or SSI. Policy 5’s increased 
enrollment is due mostly to an increase in enrollment projections for individuals who 
are not currently receiving SSDI or SSI benefits. It appears that the lower premium rates 
under Policy 5 (compared to the current policy) have a relatively large positive effect on 
the enrollment rate of those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI.  
 
Summary and Conclusions: 
 
 This report presented projections for the number of unmarried Nebraskans from 
18 to 64 years old who are expected to enroll in Nebraska’s Medicaid Insurance for 
Workers with Disabilities program. The body of the report contains enrollment 
projections under the current State policy and Appendix B contains enrollment 
projections under seven policy scenarios that differ from the current policy in either 
their income and asset qualifications or their premium schedules. 
 
 The predictions were generated using a sequential approach to estimating the 
relevant populations of Nebraskans who qualify for the program by severity of their 
work disability, by their asset- and income-qualification if they work, by their choice to 
work if they qualify, and finally by their choice to enroll. The estimates were based on 
observations of individuals from 18 to 64 years of age with self-reported work 
disabilities from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These data were contained in the 
Annual Demographic Files for March 2000 and 2001. 
 
The sequential modeling strategy and assumptions were detailed in the text. 
Information provided by aggregate statistics from the Census Bureau and the Social 
Security Administration was combined with predictions from two econometric models: 
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a model of individual earnings and a binary work-choice model. Details of the 
econometric models’ specifications and the models’ parameter estimates are presented 
in Appendix A. The estimation results were based on individual observations from 
forty-eight states in the national March 2001 CPS sample. 
 
When using the projection estimates in this report, it is useful to keep in mind 
several caveats to the estimation procedure. First, the projection model was based on the 
assumption that individuals have perfect knowledge of the rules of the Medicaid Buy-In 
Program and that enrollment in the program is costless. For example, if an individual is 
currently not receiving SSDI or SSI benefits based on a work disability, the individual 
must be certified by a review board as having a qualifying disability. We assumed that 
this process correctly identifies individuals with Medicaid-qualifying disabilities and 
that this process is costless to the individual. (Of 15 individuals who applied for 
certification in Nebraska during the past year, only 2 were accepted.)  The model was 
also based on the assumption that there is no stigma attached to public assistance 
programs. For these reasons, the enrollment projections in this report correspond to 
expected enrollment after the policy has been in place long enough for these 
assumptions to more closely mirror reality. 
 
As with any estimation process, the projection estimates are subject to sampling 
error. The nature of the sequential approach precluded the calculation of standard errors 
for the final projection estimates. Appendix A, however, reported standard errors for the 
earnings predictions and work choice predictions that were used in the sequential 
procedure. Because the size of the Nebraska CPS 2000 and 2001 sample of individuals 
with reported work disabilities was small, we would expect that our projected 
enrollment figures would have relatively large standard errors.  
 
There were also some key variables related to whether an individual qualifies for 
the Buy-In program that I could not measure directly. For example, individual assets 
were approximated by scaled reported dividends, interest and rental payments. Also, in 
Nebraska, SSDI payments are disregarded if the individual is currently in a trial work 
period. My sample did not allow me to identify those individuals.  
 
For these reasons, the projected enrollment numbers should be used as rough 
benchmarks rather than precise values of the number of enrollees. More confidence 
should be placed in the relative changes in enrollment projections due to differing 
policy scenarios. These changes in projected enrollment relative to projected enrollment 
under the current policy gauge the effect of permanent changes in policy parameters on 
enrollment. Table 7 presented the percentage changes in projected enrollment by 
SSDI/SSI status and found that eliminating Income Test A greatly benefits those 
initially receiving SSDI or SSI benefits and increasing premium rates can substantially 
reduce enrollment of qualified non-SSDI/SSI participants. 
 
 Page 17 of  41
 Appendix A: Econometric Analysis 
 
1. Model of Earnings 
 
Our earnings model follows the commonly used specification,  
 
1
log( )
k
i i
j
earnings xi iα β ε
=
= + +∑ ,  
where earnings is the individual’s reported personal earnings, the k explanatory 
variables included in x are defined below, and the error term is assumed to be 
independently distributed across individuals and have mean zero conditional on the 
values of x.  
 
 Our CPS sample includes 2141 individuals from 18 to 64 years old with self-
reported work disabilities. These individuals reside in 46 states (Massachusetts, Illinois, 
Colorado and Nevada were omitted because I could not find complete information on 
their Medicaid rules for the disabled). Of the 2141 individuals, only 646 reported 
positive earnings from the previous year. Our sample size for the estimation is therefore 
646 observations. 
 
 The final specification includes as explanatory variables nine demographic 
variables and three individual- and state-specific Medicaid policy variables, each of 
which has a statistically significant effect on log(earnings). The two continuous 
demographic variables are the individual’s age and age-squared. The other demographic 
variables are categorical. They include four educational attainment variables:  
hsgrad = 1, if the highest degree attained is a high school degree; 0, if not 
somecol = 1, if individual attended college but has no degree; 0 if not 
assocdeg = 1, if the highest degree attained is an associate degree; 0, if not 
colldeg = 1, if the highest degree attained is a bachelors degree; 0, if not 
msdoc = 1, if the individual has a masters, professional, or doctorate; 0, if not 
 
Two other categorical variables are 
 female = 1, if the individual is female; 0, if not 
 aindian = 1, if the individual identifies himself as an American Indian; 0, if not 
 
The three policy variables are 
 beincome = the individual’s break-even level of income, if positive; 0, if not 
The break-even level of income is the maximum amount of income that the 
individual can earn in order to receive Medicaid coverage in the state of  
residence. In Buy-In states, this depends on the FPG for family size, 
the individual’s unearned income and the State’s specific disregards. In non- 
Buy-In states, this depends on the State-specific income limit and disregards as 
well as the individual’s unearned income. Its general form is (income max + 
disregards- unearned income) x 2 
beincsq = beincome x beincome 
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aslim20 = State-specific limit on individual assets to qualify for Medicaid 
coverage, if the individual’s assets are below this maximum; 0, if not 
 
Table A.1 reports the estimation results for the earnings equation. Since the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings, the estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in earnings associated with a small change in the 
explanatory variable. The results suggest that a female earns less than a male of the 
same age, living in the same state with the same educational attainment, break-even 
income level and assets. American Indians also tend to earn less than other groups with 
the same characteristics.  
 
The positive effect of age and negative effect of age-squared is a common result 
in earnings equations suggesting diminishing marginal returns to a person’s age (or 
experience). We also see from the results that higher educational attainment is 
associated with higher earnings.  
 
The effects of the Medicaid policy variables on individual earnings depend how 
large an individual’s unearned income is relative to the State’s income limit for 
Medicaid coverage and how large an individual’s assets are relative to the State’s asset 
limit. According to the point estimates, for those with positive-valued break-even 
income levels, an increase in beincome tends to increase earnings but the magnitude of 
the increase decreases as beincome increases. For small changes in beincome, 
 
% [.00213% (.000000014% )]earnings beincome beincomeΔ ≅ Δ − ×   
 
This result is consistent with the belief that low income-eligibility limits for Medicaid 
coverage of individuals with work disabilities lead to decreased work effort. Individuals 
with higher break-even income levels tend to have higher earnings (at least up to a 
point.) This supports the impetus beyond the Medicaid Buy-In Program for individuals 
with severe work disabilities.  
 
For example, suppose the individual currently has a negative break-even income 
level (beincome=0) and the State increases its income eligibility limit. If the 
individual’s break-even level of income were still not positive, the policy change would 
have no effect on the individual’s earning (beincome = 0). If, however, the individual’s 
break-even income level increased by $1 due to the policy change, the model predicts 
that earnings would increase by about .00213% (1 x .00213% ). 
 
Suppose that the individual’s initial break-even income level were $20,000. In 
this case, the same $1 increase in the income limit would lead to a smaller increase in 
earnings. According to the point estimates, earnings would increase by approximately 
.00185%  (.00213% - .00028%). Thus, there appears to be diminishing returns to 
increasing individuals’ break-even income levels. The regression results show that the 
increase in individual earnings due to increasing break-even income levels (by either 
increasing allowable disregards or increasing the income limit) is smaller the higher the 
individual’s initial break-even income level. 
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According to the point estimate, an increase of $1 in aslim is associated with a 
.0037% reduction in individual earnings. This result, however, is relevant only for those 
individuals whose assets are currently below the Medicaid asset limit for their State. 
Thus, the result suggests that, for two individuals with the same characteristics 
(including the same break-even income level), if each has assets less than her State’s 
asset limit, then the person whose State’s asset limit is $1 higher than the other’s limit 
has .0037% lower earnings. In this sense, individuals in states with higher Medicaid 
asset limits tend to earn less. 
  
 
Table A.1 
 
Dependent Variable: log(earnings) 
National CPS Sample of Individuals with Self-Reported Work Disabilities 
646 Observations with Positive Earnings 
 
 β  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Significance 
Level 
Constant 6.7828 0.5918 11.46179 0.00000000 
AGE 0.0629 0.0296 2.12371 0.03408184 
AGESQ -5.5987e-04 3.5481e-04 -1.57796 0.11507535 
FEMALE -0.3631 0.1148 -3.16223 0.00164050 
HSGRAD 0.4278 0.1585 2.69966 0.00712654 
SOMECOL 0.7609 0.1703 4.46891 0.00000931 
ASSOCDEG 1.0772 0.2508 4.29552 0.00002017 
COLLDEG 1.3188 0.2245 5.87377 0.00000001 
MSDOC 1.5348 0.3573 4.29538 0.00002018 
AINDIAN -0.7235 0.3900 -1.85543 0.06399908 
BEINCOME 2.1293e-05 5.2106e-06 4.08637 0.00004945 
ASLIM20 -3.7265e-05 8.9876e-06 -4.14626 0.00003840 
BEINCSQ -7.0894e-11 2.3302e-11 -3.04238 0.00244435 
 
     
 Table A.2 presents the predicted earnings and the associated standard errors of 
three representative individuals based on the estimated national model. Each individual is 
43 years old (the median age of Nebraskans in the sample), is not an American Indian, 
has earned a high school degree (the modal educational attainment value of the Nebraska 
sample), and has a break-even income level of $42,654 (the median value for the 
Nebraska sample). The first individual is a male with assets below the $4,000 asset limit 
for Nebraska’s current Buy-In Program. The second is individual is a female with assets 
below the $4,000 asset limit for Nebraska’s current Buy-In Program. The third individual 
is a male with assets above the State’s asset limit. 
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Table A.2 
Predicted Earnings of 43 year old, High School Graduate, Non-American Indian, 
Break-even Income of $42,654 
 
FEMALE 
One, if female; 
Zero, if male 
ASLIM20 
State’s Asset Limit, if 
Assets < Limit; 
Zero, if Assets> State’s 
Asset Limit 
Predicted Annual Earnings  
in year 2000 dollars 
 
(Standard Error) 
 
   0 
 
 
   $4,000 
    
    $13,487.75 
   ($1,548.54) 
 
 
   1 
 
   $4,000 
    
    $9,380.50 
   ($1,113.50) 
 
 
   0 
  
    0 
    
    $29,970.84 
   ($5,466.04) 
 
  
 
 The predicted earnings figures in Table A.2 show the predicted differences in 
earnings associated with discrete differences in individual characteristics. (Because 
earnings is a nonlinear function of individual characteristics, the estimates of β  
presented in Table A.3 approximate the percentage change in earnings from only small 
changes in individual characteristics.)  As the results in Table A.2 show, the point 
estimates in Table A.2 have relatively large standard errors. The sampling error 
associated with the regression model’s predictions, however, is smaller than the sampling 
error associated with Howe’s method to predict earnings of non-income earners. Howe 
randomly assigns the earnings of working individuals to those in the sample who 
currently do not work. The latter method ignores the relationship between individual 
characteristics, such as education level, and individual earnings. 
 
     
 
 Page 21 of  41
2. Model of Work Choice 
 
We use a probit specification to model work choice of those individuals whose asset 
levels are below their state’s Medicaid asset limit and their earnings (or predicted 
earnings for those currently not working) qualify them for their state’s Medicaid 
program. Our specification is, 
 
 , 
1
( 1) (
k
i s
s
P Work P Z xβ
=
= = ≤∑ )i
 
where Worki = 1 if individual i earns a positive income and Worki = 0, if not.  
 
The random variable Z is distributed as a standard normal random variable and 
the k explanatory variables are described below. The model is estimated using only 
1,387 observations from the original 46 state CPS sample of 2,141 18 to 64 year olds 
with self-reported work disabilities. These individuals are those whose asset and 
(projected) income levels qualify them for Medicaid coverage in their state. 
 
 The explanatory variables included in the final specification include a subset of 
variables from the earnings equation: age and age-squared, the five educational 
attainment variables, and beincome and beincsq, as well as the following new 
variables: 
 black = 1, if the individual identifies himself as Black; 0, if not 
 states = 1, if the individual resides in Nebraska, Iowa, North Dakota, South 
   Dakota or Minnesota; 0, if not 
 asset20 = the individual’s interest, dividend and rental income scaled by 20 
 (assuming an annual 5% rate of return)  
 
Table A.3 reports the parameter estimates of the probit estimation. We can 
evaluate the direction of the impact that the explanatory variable has on the probability 
of working by examining the sign of the coefficient estimate. According to the point 
estimates, those with at least a high school degree are more likely to work than those 
whose educational  attainment is less than a high school degree. An individual who is 
black is less likely to work than a non-Black individual of the same age, education, asset 
level and break-even level of income. The probability of working increases with 
beincome and decreases with the squared value of beincome. An individual with a 
higher level of assets (but who still qualifies for Medicaid coverage) is more likely to 
work and an individual from one of the five Midwestern states included in the states 
category is more likely to work.  
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Table A.3 
 
Probit Model:  P(Work=1) = ( )i j
j
P Z xβ≤∑  
 National CPS Sample of Income and Asset-Qualified Individuals 
 with Self-Reported Work Disabilities 
1,387 Observations 
 
   
 β  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic Significance 
Level 
  Constant     -1.08118  0.087218    -12.396  0.00000 
  HSGRAD      0.31890  0.088037      3.622  0.00029 
  SOMECOL      0.63166   0.105541      5.985  0.00000 
  ASSOCDEG      0.59179  0.172366      3.433  0.00059 
  COLLDEG      0.51385  0.174426      2.946  0.00322 
  MSDOC      0.68892  0.333839      2.064  0.03905 
  BLACK    -0.19724  0.089908     -2.194  0.02825 
  BEINCOME     0.17747  0.036533      4.858  0.00000 
  BEINSQ    -0.84704  0.160757     -5.269  0.00000 
 ASSET20     0.69292  0.143731      4.821  0.00000 
 STATES     0.44346  0.191786      2.312  0.02076 
 
 
 We convert the estimates based on the national sample of individuals with self-
reported work disabilities to employment probabilities for individuals with severe work 
disabilities by scaling the national estimates by .30, the ratio of the 2000 national 
employment rate of the severely disabled to that of the disabled. Table A.4 reports the 
resulting predicted employment probabilities and associated standard errors for six 
representative individuals who qualify for Medicaid coverage. Each individual resides in 
Nebraska (or one of the other Midwestern states included in the categorical variable 
states.)  
Two individuals do not have high school degrees and have no assets. One of these 
individuals has the mean break-even income level ($46,550) of Nebraskans in the 
national sample and one has a lower break-even income ($5,000). Two individuals have 
graduated from high school but have not attended college and have the mean asset level 
of Nebraskans in the national sample ($398). One of these individuals has a higher than 
average break-even income of $60,000 and the other has break-even income of $5,000. 
The other two individuals have attended some college (the most common education level 
of Nebraskans in the national sample) and have assets of $1,500. One has the mean 
break-even income level and the other has break-even income of $60,000. 
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Table A.4 
 
Predicted Employment Rate of Non-Black Medicaid-Qualified Nebraskan with 
Severe Work Disabilities between 18 and 64 years 
 
Educational 
Attainment 
Break-Even 
Income Level (in 
year 2000 
dollars) 
Assets (in year 2000 
dollars) 
Predicted Employment 
Rate 
(Standard Error) 
 
 $46,550   
    
     $0.00 
    
    0.15059  
   (0.02497)  
 
 
  Less than 
high school 
degree 
  
  $5,000 
 
     $0.00 
 
     0.08724 
   (0.02207) 
 
 
 $60,000   
    
     $398 
    
     0.22896 
   ( 0.01995) 
 
 
  High School 
Degree 
 
 
  $5,000 
 
     $398 
 
     0.15519 
    (0.02389) 
 
  
 $46,550 
 
 
    $1,500 
 
     0.28594 
    (0.00818) 
 
 
 Some 
College 
 
 
 $60,000 
 
 
    $1,500 
 
     0.28906 
  (0.00682) 
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Appendix B: Enrollment Projections 
  
This appendix presents projected enrollments under seven Medicaid Buy-In policy 
scenarios. These policy scenarios differ from the current Nebraska policy either in their 
income eligibility requirements, their asset eligibility requirements, or their premium 
levels. Three tables are presented for each policy scenario: projected number of 
Nebraskans whose income and assets would qualify them for the program if they 
worked, projected number of qualifying Nebraskans who will work, and the projected 
number of qualifying Nebraskans who work and enroll in the program.  
 
The percentage differences in the projections under the seven policy scenarios and the 
projections under the current Nebraska policy that are presented in Table 7 in the text 
are based on the tables in this appendix. 
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Scenario 1: Same Income Requirement and Premium Schedule as 
Current Policy. Asset Limit of $10,000 instead of $4,000. 
 
 
Table 4.1: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 1 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
9,112 
 
 864 
 
9,976 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
1,608 
 
 
8,424 
 
10,032 
 
Total 
 
 
10,720 
 
9,288 
 
20,008 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 1 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
1,591 
 
188 
 
1,779 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
298 
 
1,776 
 
2,074 
 
Total 
 
 
1,889 
 
1,964 
 
3,853 
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Table 6.1 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 1 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 16 
      
13 
        
29 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
177 
 
 850 
  
1,027 
 
Total 
 
   
193 
 
  863 
  
1,056 
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Scenario 2: Same Income Requirement and Premium Schedule as 
Current Policy. Asset Limit of $20,000 instead of $4,000. 
 
 
Table 4.2: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 2 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
9,112 
 
 864 
 
9,976 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
1,608 
 
 
8,424 
 
10,032 
 
Total 
 
 
10,720 
 
9,288 
 
20,008 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 2 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
1,591 
 
188 
 
1,779 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
298 
 
1,776 
 
2,074 
 
Total 
 
 
1,889 
 
1,964 
 
3,853 
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Table 6.2 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 2 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 16 
      
13 
        
29 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
177 
 
 850 
  
1,027 
 
Total 
 
   
193 
 
  863 
  
1,056 
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Scenario 3: Same Income Requirement and Asset Limit as Current 
Policy. No Premium. 
 
 
Table 4.3: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 3 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
9,112 
 
 648 
 
9,760 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
1,608 
 
 
8,424 
 
10,032 
 
Total 
 
 
10,720 
 
9,072 
 
19,792 
 
 
Table 5.3 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 3 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
1,591 
 
123 
 
1,714 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
298 
 
1,776 
 
2,074 
 
Total 
 
 
1,889 
 
1,889 
 
3,788 
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Table 6.3 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 3 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 16 
      
 6 
        
22 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
177 
 
 931 
  
1,108 
 
Total 
 
   
193 
 
  937 
  
1,130 
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Scenario 4: Same Asset Limit as Current Policy.  
Premiums begin at 150% FPG instead of 200% FPG.  
Unearned Income is Disregarded (No Income Test A) 
 
 
Table 4.4: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 4 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
        15,544 
 
 648 
 
16,192 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
5,360 
 
 
9,072 
 
14,432 
 
Total 
 
 
20,904 
 
9,720 
 
30,624 
 
 
Table 5.4 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 4 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
2,603 
 
123 
 
2,726 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
869 
 
1,871 
 
2,740 
 
Total 
 
 
3,472 
 
1,994 
 
5,466 
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Table 6.4 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 4 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 25 
      
6 
        
31 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
326 
 
 876 
  
1,202 
 
Total 
 
   
351 
 
  882 
  
1,233 
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Scenario 5: Same Asset Limit as Current Policy. 
SSI Countable Income Limit is 450% FPG instead of 250%. 
Sliding Scale Premiums from 250% to 450% FPG  
 
 
Table 4.5: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 5 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
9,112 
 
 648 
 
9,760 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
1,608 
 
 
8,856 
 
10,464 
 
Total 
 
 
10,720 
 
9,504 
 
20,224 
 
 
Table 5.5 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 5 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
1,841 
 
131 
 
1,972 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
334 
 
1,999 
 
2,333 
 
Total 
 
 
2,175 
 
2,130 
 
4,305 
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Table 6.5 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 5 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 18 
      
6 
        
24 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
194 
 
1,060 
  
1,254 
 
Total 
 
   
212 
 
1,066 
  
1,278 
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Scenario 6: Same Income Limits as Current Policy. 
Premiums begin at 150% FPG instead of 200% FPG.  
Asset Limit is $12,000 instead of Current $4,000 Limit 
 
 
Table 4.6: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 6 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
9,112 
 
 864 
 
9,976 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
1,608 
 
 
8,424 
 
10,032 
 
Total 
 
 
10,720 
 
9,288 
 
20,008 
 
 
Table 5.6 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 6 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
1,591 
 
188 
 
1,779 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
298 
 
1,776 
 
2,074 
 
Total 
 
 
1,889 
 
1,964 
 
3,853 
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Table 6.6 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 6 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 16 
      
13 
        
29 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
177 
 
 823 
  
1,000 
 
Total 
 
   
193 
 
  836 
  
1,029 
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Scenario 7: SSI Countable Limit is 450% FPG instead of 250%. 
Unearned Income is Disregarded (No Income Test A). 
Asset Limit is $20,000 instead of Current $4,000 Limit. 
Premium is 10% of Income Above 200% FPG 
 
 
Table 4.7: 
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who 
Qualify for Policy Scenario 7 If They Were Employed 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
16,080 
 
 864 
 
16,944 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
  
5,896 
 
 
10,368 
 
16,264 
 
Total 
 
 
21,976 
 
11,232 
 
33,208 
 
 
Table 5.7 
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe 
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 7 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
 
3,235 
 
125 
 
3,360 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
1,272 
 
1,921 
 
3,193 
 
Total 
 
 
4,507 
 
2,046 
 
6,553 
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Table 6.7 
 Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll 
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 7 
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64) 
 
 
 Receives SSDI or 
SSI 
Does Not Receive 
SSDI or SSI 
Total 
Receives 
Medicaid 
 
    
 32 
      
2 
        
34 
Does Not Receive 
Medicaid 
 
   
533 
 
 490 
  
1,023 
 
Total 
 
   
565 
 
  492 
  
1,057 
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